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Abstract:  The reasons for studying the history of economic thought are diverse.  
The extreme range of reasons include suggestions that research in this field is: a 
way of passing time on an intellectual curiosity; an investment in human capital 
which contributes to a more profound understanding of modern economic 
theory; an activity of historical interest only, totally devoid of concern with the 
purely scientific merits of theories; or a subject for sociologists intent on 
understanding the culture of science and how this has influenced the evolution 
of scientific knowledge.  Interestingly, Pareto had a well developed idea of the 
scientific reasons for undertaking histories of economic thought, which he saw 
as an aspect of “experimental economics”.  This paper investigates how, and 
why, Pareto incorporated the history of economic thought as a central element 
of experimental economics.  His approach to the history of economics is shown 
to be historical, albeit in a limited sense, and non-historical, in the sense that it 
provided data for the development of experimental hypotheses and theory 
pertaining to the sociological part of the economic phenomenon.  
Key Words: Exegesis, Experimental Economics, History of Economic 
Thought, Pareto. 
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1) Introduction 
The recent A Companion to the History of Economic Thought (Samuels, Biddle and 
Davis 2003) is a very useful resource for historians of economics, mainly because the 
second of its two parts is devoted entirely to historiography.
1  It critically considers 
Whig history, rational reconstruction, historical reconstruction, the sociology of 
knowledge, textual exegesis, biography and a range of other topics in historiography.  
A priori, scholars familiar with Pareto’s work may have expected some discussion of 
his views on historiography to be included in this part of the book.  In addition to 
being a major economic theorist, his enduring contribution to sociology primarily 
concerns the sociology of knowledge and he wrote, in some detail, on the purpose of 
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histories of economics and the role of textual analysis when undertaking such studies.  
However, the part of A Companion to the History of Economic Thought that deals 
with historiography completely ignores Pareto on this subject.
2 
However, these comments are not a criticism of A Companion to the History 
of Economic Thought.  Rather, they are intended to highlight a fact: Pareto has had no 
influence on the development of research methods in the history of economics, at least 
not in the English speaking world.  In this regard, the author has been unable to 
identify any work on historiography that examines Pareto’s rather unique and well 
considered views on the relevance and methods of the history of economics.  In some 
ways this is perplexing, because his work on textual analysis in the history of 
economics appears sophisticated, even by today’s standards.  Furthermore, intellectual 
historians have failed to investigate Pareto’s views on the relevance of the history of 
economics to the development of theory concerning economic phenomena.  
The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate Pareto’s position on 
treating the history of economics as an aspect of experimental economics.  Emphasis 
is given to “Economia Sperimentale” (Pareto [1918] 1980), as this is the Giornale 
degli Economisti article in which Pareto most clearly and unequivocally reflected on 
the relevance of the history of economics, and to the aspects of his Trattato di 
Sociologia Sociale (Pareto [1916] 1935) that provide the interpretive context for much 
of “Economia Sperimentale”, especially the sociological basis for textual analysis in 
the history of economics.   
Section 2 commences by considering what Pareto meant by ‘experimental 
economics’ and, in this experimental context, highlighting his distinction between 
theories pertaining to the economic part of the economic phenomenon and theories 
pertaining to the sociological part of the economic phenomenon.  Section 3 considers 
the manner in which Pareto treated the history of economics as experimental 
economics.  It is suggested that the objective of his history of economics is not purely 
historical; rather, it is intended as an instrument for developing theory of the 
sociological part of the economic phenomenon.  However, the means of realising this 
objective are historical.  Section 4 examines the implications of Pareto’s approach: it 
contrasts Stigler’s principle of scientific exegesis with Pareto’s use of textual analysis 
in the history of economics and considers the discipline that scholars should come 
from to undertake Paretian studies in the history of economics.  It also considers 
whether Pareto’s approach has value to modern historians of economic thought.  The 
paper concludes, in Section 5, with the finding that historians of economics should 
find Pareto’s work on the history of economics relevant in the case of: (i) purely 
historical studies of Pareto’s experimental economics, because he treated the history 
of economics as a core aspect of experimental economics; (ii) purely historical studies 
of historiography, to consider why Pareto’s approach to the history of economics did 
not prove influential while his experimental economics did; and (iii) contemporary 
studies of historiography, because it has the potential to complement modern research 
methods for the history of economics. 
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2) Experimental Economics 
Pareto’s system of analysis is predicated on three major ontological elements.  First, 
he recognised that all observed social ‘facts’ are influenced, to varying degrees, by 
subjective factors which ‘deform’ representations of the objective phenomenon.
3  
Second, he suggested that subjective influences need not totally dominate scientific 
observation of social facts in experimental science because subjective influences on 
observation can be progressively reduced (not eliminated) in the classes of theory that 
are capable of scientific progress.  The accumulation of scientific knowledge enables 
observers to progressively reduce the influence of subjective factors on observations 
of social conduct, enabling observation to bring social scientists closer to the 
objective phenomenon.  Of course, he recognised that non-experimental sciences may 
not progress: it is only experimental science that Pareto linked to increased 
knowledge.  Third, and most important for his views on the history of economics, he 
contended that the objective form of a phenomenon can be directly observed (albeit 
imperfectly) and the subjective form can be indirectly observed as residual 
‘sentiment’ evident from textual analysis (once pure reason has been stripped away 
from text).   
Importantly, Pareto did not just recognise the objective form and the 
subjective form of phenomena, he also emphasised interaction between the objective 
and subjective forms.  This was the catalyst for Pareto treating the social phenomena 
as a dichotomy: one which required treatment using two distinct sets of analytical 
methods.  One set of analytical methods was adopted for circumstances where each 
individual’s subjective intent is independent of objective events and acts as a constant 
(invariable) force on human action in like objective circumstances.  This set of 
analytical methods provides for highly deterministic closed system analysis 
predicated on logical action.  Another set of analytical methods was required when 
each individual’s subjective intent is interdependent with objective events, resulting in 
subjective intent acting as a variable force on human action in otherwise like objective 
circumstances.  This set of analytical methods is predicated on non-logical action and 
only provides for a low degree of determinism and relatively open ended system 
analysis. 
Pareto regarded the economic phenomenon as covering both sides of this 
dichotomy, and for the economic phenomenon to be investigated with analytical 
instruments appropriate for each side of the dichotomy.  The primary issue Pareto 
faced when studying economic phenomena concerned the first part of the dichotomy: 
how to undertake experimental investigation of economic conduct when human action 
is influenced by subjective elements in a ‘constant’ manner under like objective 
circumstances.  This may be considered the ‘economic part’ of the economic 
phenomenon, and it is the subject of pure economic theory.  The secondary issue in 
Pareto’s study of economic phenomena was how to undertake experimental 
investigation of conduct when human action is influenced by subjective elements in a 
variable manner in like objective circumstances.  This may be called the ‘sociological 
part’ of the economic phenomenon, which Pareto studied with reference to the history 
of economics.   
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The ‘Economic Part’ of the Economic Phenomenon  
Pareto’s pure economic equilibrium addresses the economic part of the study of the 
economic phenomenon.  In this context, experimentalism is presented as the 
cornerstone of economic study.  Importantly, experimentalism to Pareto was not just 
about observation, as it also relied on abstractions to identify general uniformities: 
“we are still perfectly within the experimental field, as long as we never 
forget that these abstractions were created by us, that they do not dominate 
the facts but are themselves dominated by the facts, and that the results to 
which they will lead us do not conform to experience but within certain 
limits, and that, in order to have a concept, however distant and rough, of 
these limits, it is necessary to define either rigorously, or approximately, or, 
at worst, roughly, how these abstractions of the facts are obtained.” (Pareto 
[1918] 1980, p. 725) 
To underline his conviction that abstractions must be dominated by facts and 
conform with experience, “Economia Sperimentale” devotes considerable attention to 
non-experimental approaches to value theory.  After confessing his ‘ignorance’ of the 
notion we call value, and armed only with an understanding of the experimental 
method, Pareto sought enlightenment from the works of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (1896), 
John Bates Clark (1907) and Camillo Supino (1904).  With a level of sarcasm that 
was not a-typical, he could find no experimental meaning of this notion in the work of 
these authors, only propositions in which abstractions dominate facts.
4  When Pareto 
introduced his own abstraction, ophelimity, it was subordinate to facts.  The 
experimental character of pure theory does not depend on whether an ordinal or 
cardinal approach to value is utilized, rather, it simply requires “… a mathematical 
function of experimental data” (Pareto [1918] 1980, p. 719).  Mathematical 
economics does not loose its experimental character: 
“if the abstraction of ophelimity were only put forward as a hypothesis, 
with the obligation to verify experimentally the results the hypothesis leads 
to. But mathematical Economics loses its character as a logico-
experimental science if it allows ophelimity to exist independently of the 
facts of which an explanation is sought, and if it wishes to assume the 
logical consequences of a hypothesis as demonstrations.” (Pareto [1918] 
1980, p. 728) 
 
Critically, Pareto’s notion of experimental economics does not end here.  In 
fact, the fundamental importance of experimental observation in Pareto’s system is 
largely missed if one does not relate experimental economics back to his basic 
behavioural dichotomy.  The primary purpose of experimental economics is to 
confirm whether an economic phenomenon is dominated by its ‘economic part’ (in 
which case subjective intent acts as a constant force on human action in like objective 
circumstances) or whether it is dominated by its ‘sociological part’ (in which case 
subjective intent is dependent on objective events and acts as a variable force on 
human action in like objective circumstances).  Phenomena that fall into the first part 
are amenable to theoretical representation based on deductive reasoning that 
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commences from a hypothetical postulate, such as the postulate of ophelimity 
maximizing action.  Phenomena that fall into the second part are not.  Instead, they 
are treated by deduction based on uniformities first established through textual 
analysis. 
The experimental character of the ‘economic part’ of Pareto’s study of the 
economic phenomenon has been well considered recently in Marchionatti and 
Gambino (1997), Marchionatti (1999) and Bruni (2002).  However, the importance of 
the experimental character of economics for the sociological part of Pareto’s study of 
the economic phenomenon has not received due consideration.  The two parts must be 
considered together before Pareto’s notion of experimental economics can be fully 
appreciated.  That is, experimentalism provides the basis for determining whether the 
economic or sociological parts prevail in economic problems: 
“there is almost no concrete problem that is exclusively economic, and not 
economic and sociological at the same time. In fact, very often the 
sociological part prevails over the economic part; examples of this are: the 
problem of free trade, or tariff protection; many monetary problems; almost 
all taxation problems; and other similar problems. ... one does not leave the 
experimental field if one studies the economic and sociological parts 
separately.”  (Pareto [1918] 1980 , p. 733). 
 
3) The History of Economics as ‘Experimental Economics’ 
The important feature of Pareto’s sociology is that economic theories are observable 
facts, and the history of economics provides for the analysis of ‘facts’ from which 
hypothetical propositions can be developed in relation to the ‘sociological part’ of the 
economic phenomenon.  That is, the history of economics provides the basis for 
developing theories pertaining to the sociological part of the economic phenomenon 
for which axiomatic modelling produces poor (unacceptable) approximations: 
“… theories are facts. This remark is very true, and the history of those 
facts is the foundation of a theory about them, that is, a theory about 
theories.”  (Pareto [1918] 1980 , p. 742). 
To appreciate the importance of Pareto’s theory of theories to experimental 
economics, it is first necessary to consider the distinction between the intrinsic and 
extrinsic elements of theory, as outlined in his Sociologia.  The intrinsic  aspect 
concerns the soundness of theory in terms of its relationship to facts and the extrinsic
5 
aspect concerns the relationship between a theory and society collectively without 
regard to the theory’s intrinsic scientific merit.  Intrinsic merit is considered with 
reference to the closeness of the relationship to theory and fact pertaining to the 
primary phenomenon under investigation, and the extrinsic considers the merits or 
demerits of action advocated by theories for various members of society (those who 
advance a theory or those who adopt a theory) or for society more generally. 
Pareto’s theory of theories, which he referred to as derivations, suggests that theories 
derive from subjective sentiments, which are linked to the extrinsic aspects.   
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Derivations have been discussed thoroughly and extensively elsewhere (Parsons 1937, 
Finer 1966, Tarascio 1968, de Pietri-Tonelli and Bousquet 1994), so for the purpose 
of this study it is adequate to simply note that they combine sentiment and reason in a 
non-experimental manner.  Importantly, the use of textual devices to persuade can be 
systematically analysed.  Theories may utilise assertion, ranging from theoretical 
hypothesis to blunt statement of apparently self evident truths, make reference to the 
authority of authors (distinguished scholars, schools or traditions), make reference to 
sentiment and metaphysics (vague social welfare notions associating benefit to those 
who advance an idea to the benefit of the collective) or utilise analogies.  If these 
devices are adopted in experimental theory, they are being used to support the 
development of intrinsic science by illustrating theory or persuade others of its 
scientific merit.  However, the main use of such devices, which was of most interest 
to Pareto, was non-experimental: to persuade and influence others by exaggerating the 
extrinsic benefits of proposed action (policy).  
Pareto’s textual exegesis of the history of economic theories revolves around 
the relationship between both the intrinsic and the extrinsic: “Both methods, if used 
exclusively, are equally incomplete.” (Pareto [1916] 1935, pp.503-04).  When the 
intrinsic aspects of theory dominate, science is experimental.  Analysis of the extrinsic 
was designed to provide insight into human action when the individual’s subjective 
intent is interdependent with objective events, with the extrinsic aspects of social 
doctrines and theories significant sources variation in subjective forces through 
‘persuasion’ and preference modification. 
One important implication of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction for the history 
of economics is the necessity of considering whether progress in economic theory is 
‘asymptotic’, in which case scientific knowledge is cumulative but imperfect, or not 
asymptotic, in which case knowledge is neither cumulative nor perfect.  It is 
asymptotic when the intrinsic aspect of theory continues to grow, permitting 
intellectual historians to speak of progress in particular classes of economic theory.  If 
it is not asymptotic, the intrinsic aspects merely fluctuate as new extrinsic elements 
are introduced in response to extrinsic considerations, in which case historians cannot 
speak of progress in the remaining classes of economic theory. 
Interestingly, in History of Economic Analysis, Joseph Schumpeter (1954) 
faced similar interpretive issues, and his classification of economics texts bear some 
relation to Pareto’s generic intrinsic-extrinsic distinction.  Schumpeter classed 
economics texts in term of whether they dealt with: systems of political economy; 
economic thought; or economic analysis.  The history of systems of political economy 
was characterised as dealing with opinions and desires about the economic system and 
the history of economic thought was characterised as dealing with ideas about public 
policy and economics.  These two classes of text may be considered broad examples 
of what Pareto associated with the extrinsic elements of theory.  Schumpeter’s notion 
of the history of economic analysis, which is the main aspect of his interest in 
intellectual history, is concerned with scientific progress and is closely related to 
Pareto’s general notion of intrinsic aspects of science.  However, the similarity must 
not be overstated: while both masters stressed the sociology of knowledge, to Pareto 
this field was the primarily consideration for the extrinsic aspects of science, whereas 
to Schumpeter ‘vision’ and ideology were treated as important motivating factors in 
scientific progress.  The similarity concerns their understanding of the interpretive   6
problem, but their objectives for the history of economics were different.  As a 
consequence, their solutions to this interpretive problem were diverse, and the focus 
of their historical research, were quite different.  
History of Economics – The ‘Economic Part’ 
In regard to analysis of theory pertaining to the economic part of the economic 
phenomenon, namely the theory of economic equilibrium for the analysis of exchange 
and production, Pareto acknowledged the asymptotic or cumulative view of scientific 
knowledge.  This is because experimental observation has confirmed that modelling 
equilibrium on the assumption that subjective intent is a constant influence in given 
objective circumstances provides an acceptable first approximation to reality.  In such 
circumstances, the history of economics is an end in itself and its progress can be 
considered using essentially logical criteria.  In modern terms, rational criteria would 
be used to historically review progress in a discipline.  The rational criteria are 
acknowledged as imperfect (the current state of knowledge in a particular place and 
time), but they allow an approximate indication of progress.   
In the case of economic phenomena dominated by the economic aspect, such 
as for the theories of exchange and production, the result of Paretian history of 
economics is essentially Whig history.  This is because such theories are dominated 
by their ‘intrinsic’ aspects, and modern notions of experimental economics provide 
the assessment criteria.  However, this aspect of the history of economics held little 
interest for Pareto: to him, the history of economics is most potent and vibrant in the 
case of theories for which the sociological part of the economic phenomena influences 
the extrinsic aspect of theories, and vice-versa.  
History of Economics – the ‘Sociological Part’ 
When the extrinsic aspects of economic theories are significant, Pareto rejected the 
‘asymptotic’ view of cumulative scientific knowledge.  In particular, the asymptotic 
scientific progress does not apply to theories that treat the ‘sociological part’ of the 
economic phenomenon through deductive reasoning based on a hypothetical 
proposition.  As the subjective intent of action pertaining to the sociological part of 
the economic phenomenon is not a constant force on human action in like objective 
circumstances, such an approach yields deductive rationalisation rather than 
experimental science. 
The difference between theories with and without asymptotes can be well 
illustrated by considering Pareto’s distinction between ophelimity and utility.   
Deductions concerning exchange and production are based on the notion of 
ophelimity – the relationship of convenience between a person and things – and 
behaviour that maximises ophelimity may be roughly confirmed experimentally.  That 
is, stable equilibrium in exchange and production can be observed by monitoring 
price averages for consumer goods and productive serves and the fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics are consistent with this observed relationship.   
However, when deductions are based on propositions about utility, which extends the 
notion of ophelimity to include benefits from relationships between a person and other 
people (including third parties), hypothetical deductions are unlikely to be confirmed 
by experimental observation.  When economic theories are deduced from a 
hypothetical postulate based on utility and concerning ‘things’ other people should   7
have, or how other people should behave, they have little intrinsic (scientific) merit 
because they are generally not confirmed by experimental observation.  Nevertheless, 
their extrinsic elements are numerous and Pareto was a strong advocate of economists 
undertaking historical studies of non-experimental economic theories over history to 
identify regularities of the range of subjective influences on the economic 
phenomenon that are not amenable to theory based on axiomatic representation.  
History of Economics as Experimental Economics 
In general terms, Pareto treated action as falling within the ‘sociological part’ of 
economic phenomena when individuals, or groups of individuals, act to directly or 
indirectly redistribute economic goods.  While theories which advocate some 
redistribution of economic goods are phrased in terms of collective benefits, benefits 
for certain classes of disadvantaged people etc, he interpreted the outcome in terms of 
the relative change in access to productive resources by speculators (high risk 
investors and workers whose pecuniary interests depend on high risk economic 
activity) and rentiers (low risk investors, savers and workers in secure employment 
whose pecuniary interests do not directly depend on the activity of speculators).  This 
is especially the case for the activities of government: trade/protection policy, fiscal 
policy and monetary policy all have distributive consequences that alter resources 
available to speculators of rentiers.  Private actions may also be influenced by 
dynamic factors that relate to changes in sentiment: changes in economic and social 
equilibria may alter the distribution of economic goods and impact on economic 
growth.  It is the history of economic theories pertaining to such phenomena that most 
interested Pareto, as they provided fertile ground for developing theories of economic 
phenomena influenced by government decisions (and the influence of economic 
actions on government decisions). 
The primary observed regularity that Pareto discerned from studying the 
history of economics is that theories on the economic role of government not only 
advocate change in the distribution of economic goods, it is overwhelmingly done in a 
manner that supports the interests of the governing classes and their supporters 
(prevailing political and economic elites united through informal patron-client 
relations) and to the disadvantage of potential alternative governing classes and the 
subject classes generally.  For trade theory, fiscal theory or monetary theory; the story 
is essentially the same.  Pareto illustrates the situation for monetary theories in 
“Economia Sperimentale”.   
“The theory of money is one of those that does not have asymptotes; it 
fluctuates indefinitely between the theory of money-as-a-token and money-
as-a-good; all that varies are the justifications that are offered for it and the 
methods through which it is forced on the public.”  (Pareto [1918] 1980, p. 
734)  
In short, Pareto used the history of economics to identify an enduring long 
period cyclical pattern, with theories fluctuating between stable currency (money-as-
a-good) theories and fiat money (money-as-a-token) theories, with the latter 
rationalising large increases in monetary emissions in particular circumstances.   
While the importance of a stable currency is usually acknowledged, fiat money 
theories advocating a policy of issuing of paper money in a manner that depreciates   8
the value of a currency emerge at relatively irregular intervals, each time explaining 
why issuing money is beneficial in the current circumstance.  
The specific purpose of Pareto’s analysis of the history of economics is to 
investigate whether economic theories pertaining to the welfare of society reflect the 
interests of the prevailing government and related economic elites (e.g. speculators) 
against alternative elites (e.g. rentiers and competing political elites) and the subject 
classes generally.  From the history of economics, Pareto’s general answer is in the 
affirmative.  He then seeks to verify this experimentally through the study of 
economic history.  Staying with the example of monetary theory, Pareto found that 
stable monetary theories and policies dominate in the short period, but in the long 
term, the fluctuation between stable theories/policies and policies that deflate the 
value of currency is the principle regularity.  Towards the end of World War I he 
wrote that: 
“we are seeing measures being resuscitated that we thought were dead and 
buried forever, that they want us to believe that the future will resemble 
neither the past nor the present, that we will have no further reductions in 
the value of the unit of currency, in debts, in the various commitments of 
the States, that what has always been will never happen again, that the 
uniformity that was observed for so many centuries will disappear.” (Pareto 
[1918] 1980, p. 736)   
The relevance of this to current theory is direct. The history of monetary 
theory, and the practice of monetary policy, are both motivated by the prevailing 
and/or opposing economic and political elites who are attempting to defend, or 
acquire, economic benefits that derive from positions of political and economic 
authority.  The success, and lack of such success, of public policies contribute to 
economic, social and political cycles, which Pareto links to the circulation of the elite. 
 
“If one considers short periods of time, no longer than one century, one can 
suppose, at least for certain, indeed few countries, without moving too far 
way from experience, that money is an exclusively economic tool, and one 
can more or less accept the theory of money-as-a-good. However, for long 
periods of time, of several centuries, the sociological character of money 
becomes predominant, it appears as a tool that is always used to reduce the 
debts of the State and of certain social classes, and therefore as a potent 
factor in the circulation of those selected classes.” (Pareto [1918] 1980, p. 
736) 
In an analogous way, Pareto considered the impact on the struggle between 
speculators and rentiers of policies advocates in theories of protection, public debt, 
taxation and ‘public needs’, all theories where the sociological part of the economic 
phenomenon dominates the economic part.  The fiscal sociology that developed in 
Italy in the early twentieth century was largely inspired by Pareto, with important 
studies by Borgatta (1920) and Sensini ([1917] 1933).
6  When theory was 
complemented by the study of economic history, Pareto confirmed his key regularity 
of the sociological part of the economic phenomenon: governments (and sometimes 
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private entities) never leave private property unscathed.  The methods that Pareto 
identified for non-voluntary redistribution of economic goods among speculators and 
rentiers include: (i) direct abolition of private debts (law);(ii) direct State bankruptcy 
(fiscal and monetary policy); (iii) changes in the value of currencies (monetary 
policy); (iv) reduction of public debt (through loose monetary policy); (v) state 
appropriation (fiscal policy); (vi) redistribution of goods from rich to the poor (fiscal 
policy); and (vii) price increases through protection and public or private monopolies 
(international and domestic trade policy).
7 
 
As an experimentalist, Pareto quite simply insisted that the abovementioned 
methods for redistributing economic goods be treated as regularities that must be 
reflected in logico-experimental theories of the sociological part of the economic 
phenomenon.  He was dismissive and scathing when this was ignored and replaced by 
deduction from a hypothetical postulate.
8   
 
4) Implications and Assessment 
Pareto’s approach to the history of economics has implications for the character of 
textual analysis and for the type of intellectual historians who should undertake 
research in the history of economics.  In regard to the first point, the modern 
benchmark that historians of economics use for textual analysis derives from “Textual 
Exegeses as a Scientific Problem” by George Stigler (1965).  Given the objectives of 
this study, there are similarities and difference between the textual exegesis of Stigler 
and Pareto that warrant consideration.  In regard to the second point, the question 
arises as to whether Pareto’s approach to the history of economics is best undertaken 
by economists (because it investigates theories of the economic phenomenon) or 
sociologists (because it investigates theories pertaining to the sociological part of the 
economic phenomenon).  
Textual Exegesis 
 
Stigler’s critical point is that relying on citations as evidence to support a particular 
interpretation of a scholar’s work is generally misleading.  Authors in history are 
often careless writers, or they may have had scatterings of theoretical elements that 
are not integrated.  He regarded these diverse and unintegrated elements to be of little 
importance, and considered constant resort to citations as leading to different 
historians developing different interpretations of theory, some of which devalue the 
main conclusions of historical works.  To correct this, Stigler advocated the principle 
of scientific exegesis, where the relative importance of particular aspects of a past 
economic theory is tested with reference to the original theorists’ main conclusions.   
 
“This rule of interpretation is designed to maximize the value of a theory to 
the science.  The man’s central theoretical position is isolated and stated in 
a strong form capable of contradictions by facts.  The net scientific 
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an understanding of real effects it substitutes a presumption of imaginary effects.  I cannot concede that 
the economic state and the social state are not variously modified by various changes in the use of 
economic goods” (Pareto 1975: 984). 
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contribution, if any, of a man’s work is thus identified, amended if 
necessary, and rendered capable of evaluation and possible acceptance.” 
(Stigler 1965, p.448). 
Stigler also contrasts scientific exegesis against personal exegesis, which deals 
with what the author meant.  Interpretation based on personal exegesis may be the 
same as that based on scientific exegesis, in such cases the theorist is working on 
positive theory, or they may be different, such as in cases where the theorist is not 
working on positive theory but still manages to contribute to the progress of science. 
 
Stigler’s approach has been criticised for assuming that the interpreter has 
prior knowledge of the work that is being reviewed.  Emmett (2003, p527) notes that 
a hermeneutic circle emerges: to interpret an author’s contribution to science, the 
intellectual historian must first know the author’s central theoretical position.   
Moreover, the circle is only closed when considered in a timeless sense, with Stigler 
regarding the author’s central scientific message as the received view of the 
economics profession.  The outcome is a tendency to Whig history. 
 
Pareto’s goal for the history of economics only agrees with Stigler in respect 
to economic theories for which knowledge is asymptotic.  That is, for the class of 
theories where the extrinsic element diminishes over time and the intrinsic element 
becomes more profound.  For such theories, the Paretian approach too has a tendency 
to Whig theory, with the associated reliance on rational and experimental assessment 
criteria.  The only notable difference between the two approaches to exegesis and 
theories with asymptotes is emphasis: Pareto placed much less emphasis on individual 
theorists’ contributions to economics than Stigler, preferring instead to emphasise the 
general history of theories. 
 
However, the critical difference between the two is that Stigler’s scientific 
exegesis filters out and excludes the ‘extrinsic’ elements of theory.  To Pareto, this is 
totally untenable, as he regarded the extrinsic elements of theory as the part for which 
textual analysis was most important.  Scientific textual analysis of uniformities in the 
extrinsic aspect of theory provides insight into how interaction between sentiment and 
reason combine in theories, which is mirrored in actions.  The text that is screened out 
in Stigler’s scientific exegesis is precisely the text that Pareto treated as the most 
fertile field for the history of economics.   
 
Who should undertake Histories of Economic Thought 
Given Pareto’s objective of using the history of economics to better understand the 
sociological part of the economic phenomenon, the question arises as to who should 
research, and review, studies in the history of economics: economists or sociologists?  
A similar issue has been discussed relatively recently, with Margaret Schabas (1992) 
indicating that the history of economics will, and should, be a subject for historians of 
science to shift research away from economists narrower focus on economic ideas and 
move towards a broader historical focus on the philosophy of science. 
Prima facie, one may expect Schabas’s assessment to be consistent with 
Pareto’s view.  He emphasised the theory of theories (sociology of knowledge) in 
studying the history of economics.  He also examined the history of economics in   11
conjunction with economic history, which complements Schabas’s goal of exploring 
the conditions in which theories arise.  Perhaps surprisingly then Pareto considered it 
“rather ridiculous that the history of economics is compiled mostly by people who do 
not know the science of Economics” (Pareto [1918] 1980 , p.734). 
Pareto’s position on this issue is governed by two main factors: a concern 
about the capacity of non-economists to undertake research in the history of 
economics; and his emphasis on the experimental objective. 
In regard to the first factor, the initial and critical analytical step is the 
differentiation of the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of theory.  This is a task that 
Pareto only entrusts to experimental economists, as the criteria for judging intrinsic 
merit is given by the current state of experimental economics.  This implies that 
economists undertaking intellectual histories must also have knowledge of the “theory 
of theories” to analyse the extrinsic dimension and to then isolate the related general 
uniformities.  The implication of this is that Pareto was wary of non-economists’ 
ability to acquire a sound knowledge of experimental economics, with the associated 
risk that they may treat the intrinsic aspects of experimental economics as if they were 
extrinsic. 
In regard to the second factor, Pareto regarded the history of economics as a 
means to a non-historical end: developing modern theories of the sociological part of 
the economic phenomenon.  As a consequence, the investigative questions asked of 
historical texts derive primarily from non-historical concerns.  The scholar to benefit 
most from such investigation is not the sociologist, or the intellectual historian, but 
the economist developing theory on the effect of government on the economic 
phenomenon.  This position is not only in stark contrast to Schabas, but also to the 
general body of modern academic historians of economic thought. 
Intellectual Historical? 
 
Given Pareto’s non-historical objective for studies in the history of economics and 
studies in economic history, it is useful to consider whether his approach to exegesis 
and the history of economics is really historical.  
 
Texts examined under Pareto’s approach are historical bodies of work. At this 
level, the approach he advocated is clearly historical.  However, as the textual analysis 
is undertaken solely in terms of the relationship between logic and experimental 
observation, not all historians of economics would accept this as historical 
scholarship.  For instance, comments by Peter Gronewegen (2002) and Luigino Bruni 
(2003) suggest that they may not class historical research that relies on the logic of 
theory (judged by modern standards of economic theory) as history of economics.  
Bruni points to dangers of ‘modern exegesis’ because consideration is not given to 
personal and social influences such as the prevailing culture of science, the author’s 
life, the effect of the author’s interlocutors or the effect of the author’s sources.  In 
Pareto’s approach, none of these four elements appear as primary considerations.  It is 
the relationship between fact and theory that is decisive, with emphasis given to the 
rise and fall of theories that are dominated by extrinsic elements outweighing 
concerns about the contribution of any particular author. 
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In addition, the level of generalisation associated with Pareto’s approach is 
much greater than that usually pursued by intellectual historians.  For example, in the 
case of monetary theory, his approach is primarily directed towards establishing 
whether theories support stable or inflationary monetary policies, with the theoretical 
form of such theories treated as a secondary issue to the policy being advocated.  The 
theoretical form is largely treated as a mechanism to rationalise an outcome, with the 
interests and sentiments served by such outcomes being the prime interest.  In 
mainstream history of economics, the emphasis is typically reversed: the essential 
characteristics of a theory, its development, reception and legacy are all issues of 
primary importance.  For example, a purely Paretian history of twentieth century 
monetary theory would be more concerned with the policies advocated by Keynesian, 
monetarist or new-classical theories (i.e. stable monetary policies or inflationary 
policies) than the formal representation of the theories developed by these schools.   
 
Nevertheless, when Pareto’s approach is considered with respect to the criteria 
that Ian Kerr (2002) associated with the “Value of the History of Economic Thought”, 
the value of the history of economics generally, and that of Pareto’s approach to the 
field specifically, overlap significantly.  Kerr suggests that that the history of 
economic thought is of value for: its intrinsic worth
9 (a pure consumption activity); 
enriching understanding of the discipline (demonstrating the development of ideas); 
avoiding errors of the past (avoiding sunk costs); extending the range of hypothesis 
(while methods of analysis from the past may be redundant, the types of questions 
asked may still be relevant); highlighting unfulfilled evolutionary potential (issues lost 
in the subsequent syntheses my still be relevant – so the study of the work of the 
masters can have benefits); offsetting neglected holism (relevance of integrated 
systems), preserving alternative paradigms (preserve intellectual heritage, as we 
attempt to preserve cultural heritage); and providing long term perspective 
(transcending fads and fashion). 
Pareto’s approach to the history of economics meets several of these criteria.  
It is intended to enrich understanding of the discipline, avoid errors of the past, extend 
the range of hypothesis, consider unfulfilled evolutionary potential and provide a long 
term perspective on the development of theories.  While preservation of alternative 
paradigms is not a specific objective of the Paretian approach, it is an indirect 
consequence of treating theories of the past as the factual data for textual analysis.  
However, Pareto placed little or no emphasis on the history of economics as 
mechanism for satisfying human curiosity or reducing the neglect of holism 
(although, he did not deny the intrinsic scientific merit of holism, in either the history 
of theory or contemporary theory, as long as holistic theories were also experimental).  
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the non-historical objectives of Pareto’s 
history of economics has the effect of directing attention away from matters that 
modern intellectual scholars regard as fundamental.  This raises the question, can 
Pareto’s approach to textual analysis be utilised in modern histories of economic 
thought undertaken without regard to the development of contemporary theories?  I 
believe that it can: the fundamental distinction between the economic and the 
sociological parts of theory of the economic phenomenon with textual exegesis based 
on the intrinsic and the extrinsic aspects of theory, and the associated identification of 
                                                 
9 Kerr uses the term intrinsic in relation to the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, and not the 
experimental significance of theory (as used by Pareto).    13
the asymptotic and non-asymptotic aspects of theory, provide the basis for a historical 
framework that first isolates rational, sentimental and experimental elements of theory 
and then permits concurrent development of Whig history and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge.  Of course, there can be no suggestion that Paretian textual 
analysis should replace modern historiography – constructivism, the new sociology of 
scientific knowledge and other approaches retain their value for the history of 
economic thought.  However, it complements modern research methods and provides 
a basis for uniting apparently contradictory methods in the history of economic 
thought, with rational and sociological constructions becoming complements. 
 
5) Conclusion 
Pareto’s approach to the history of economics has been neglected by historians of 
economics.  Although ‘neglect’ is a very strong term, in this case it is appropriate 
because Pareto’s views on the history of economics are an important feature of the 
history of experimental economics.  Intellectual historians should consider Pareto’s 
views on the history of economics for the same reasons that they have considered his 
choice theory: they are both important aspects of the same issue - the development of 
an experimental approach to economic theory.  The subject is also relevant to 
historical studies of historiography, although for a negative reason: to consider why 
Pareto’s approach to the history of economics did not prove influential.  Scholars 
interested in contemporary historiography would also benefit from considering 
Pareto’s approach to textual exegesis (especially the distinction between 
intrinsic/asymptotic the extrinsic/non-asymptotic aspects of theories pertaining to the 
‘economic’ and the ‘sociological’ parts of the economic phenomenon) because it may 
complement modern research methods in the history of economics.   
Finally, the role that Pareto assigned to the history of economics should not be 
dismissed.  The sociological aspect of the economic phenomenon continues to prove 
resistant to realistic Cartesian modelling, and in such circumstances, the history of 
economics may still provide a useful mechanism for developing experimental theory. 
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